In the UK the types of genetic tests that insurers may be privy to for policies exceeding the cap is also restricted to those genetic tests (diseases) that are judged to be “relevant” by a committee which is independent of the insurance industry. [...] The Canadian system feels that it is wrong to deny the less wealthy the right to the same care available to the rich. [...] Let us refer to this latter case as one in which it is not moral to use the differentiating property for the purpose proposed (i.e., less pay to the black player) and the former case as one in which it is; that is, skill is a morally differentiating property in that in the context of player-pay a differential can be supported on moral grounds. [...] Note that the so-called ‘insurable interest’ is a subjective matter, although for sake of simplicity we take these amounts to be literally the wealth or income that is available to the family; so if the breadwinner lives the family has $220,000 while if the breadwinner dies the family has $20,000. [...] The implications for all of the scenarios described above are given in Table 1. Net wealth, which is calculated for both the life and death states of the world, depends on both the amount of insurance purchased and the per unit price charged.
health government politics economics economy insurance discrimination biology cancer economic equilibrium ethics government policy health insurance health policy medical genetics contract economic model disease medical records genetics, medical prejudice genetic screening genetic testing insurer adverse selection premiums society economic inequality insured genetic privacy virus disease insurers discrimination in insurance utilitarian insureds