The Large-Scale Structure of Inductive Inference

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Table of Contents

• Front Cover 1
• Half Title Page 2
• Series Page 3
• Full Title Page 4
• Copyright Page 5
• Contents 6
• List of Figures 10
• List of Tables 12
• Preface 14
• Introduction 18
• 1. The Project of This Volume 18
• 2. Part I: General Claims and Arguments 21
• 3. Part II: Historical Case Studies 26
• 1 | The Material Theory of Induction, Briefly 32
• 1. Introduction 32
• 2. The Material Theory of Induction 33
• 3. Enumerative Induction 40
• 4. Analogy 45
• 5. Hypothetical Induction 51
• 6. Simplicity 54
• 7. Bayes 61
• 8. Conclusion 69
• Appendix: Laplace’s Rule of Succession 69
• PART I - General Claims and Arguments 74
• 2 | Large-Scale Structure: Four Claims 76
• 1. Introduction 76
• 2. Nonhierarchical Relations of Inductive Support 79
• 3. The Role of Hypotheses in the Discovery ofInductive Relations of Support 90
• 4. Deductive Inferences in Inductive Structures 96
• 5. The Maturity of a Science 100
• 6. Inductively Self-Supporting Structures 105
• 7. Nonempirical Components of the Large-ScaleStructure of Inductive Support 108
• 8. Conclusion 112
• 3 | Circularity 116
• 1. Fear of Circles 116
• 2. Vicious Circularity 117
• 3. Indeterminate Circularities 122
• 4. Determinate Circularities 127
• 5. Conclusion 132
• 4 | The Uniqueness of Domain-Specific Inductive Logics 136
• 1. The Challenge Posed 136
• 2. The Uniqueness of Mature Sciences 139
• 3. Competition Is Empirically Decidable 140
• 4. Inductive Competition Is Unstable 141
• 5. Illustrations of Instability 142
• 6. Unconceived Alternatives 150
• 7. The Underdetermination Conjecture 151
• 8. Observationally Equivalent Theories 154
• 9. Formal Accounts 156
• 10. Conclusion 158
• 5 | Coherentism and the Material Theory of Induction 160
• 1. Introduction 160
• 2. Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification 162
• 3. Similarities 163
• 4. Dissimilarities 164
• 5. Problems of Coherentism 177
• 6. Probabilistic Accounts of Coherence 180
• 7. Why the Bayesian Analysis of Coherence Fails 181
• 8. Conclusion 187
• 6 | The Problem of Induction 192
• 1. Synopsis 192
• 2. Introduction 195
• 3. What the Modern Problem of Induction Is Not:Inductive Anxiety 197
• 4. Hume’s Critique 199
• 5. The Reception 202
• 6. The Nineteenth-Century Hiatus 203
• 7. Twentieth-Century Revival: The Circularity Formulation 207
• 8. Twentieth-Century Expansion: The Regress Formulation 212
• 9. Logic of Induction, Not Epistemology of Belief 215
• 10. Epistemology Does Not Solve the Problem ofInduction 217
• 11. The Material Dissolution of the Problem of Induction 221
• 12. Regresses 221
• 13. Circularities 227
• 14. Sober and Okasha 229
• 15. What Justifies Induction in the Material Theory 232
• 16. Critical Responses to the Material Dissolution 233
• 17. Conclusion 241
• PART II - Historical Case Studies 246
• 7 | The Recession of the Nebulae 248
• 1. Introduction 248
• 2. Background to Hubble’s Investigations 251
• 3. The Determination of Distances 253
• 4. From Particulars to Generalities 257
• 5. Hubble’s Hypotheses 259
• 6. From Generalities to Particulars 262
• 7. How Strong Was the Evidence for Linearity? 265
• 8. Conclusion and Summary 266
• Appendix: Luminosity and Magnitude 269
• 8 | Newton on Universal Gravitation 274
• 1. Introduction 274
• 2. The Moon Test 275
• 3. The Inferences Summarized 277
• 4. Elliptical Orbits and the Inverse Square Law 280
• 5. The Exactness of the Inverse Square Law 282
• 6. Conclusion 285
• 9 | Mutually Supporting Evidence in Atomic Spectra 286
• 1. Introduction 286
• 2. The Discovery of Regularities in Emission Spectra 1
• 3. The Ritz Combination Principle 292
• 4. Mutually Supporting Evidence 293
• 5. Supporting the Ritz Combination Principle 296
• 6. Bohr’s Theory of the Atom 297
• 7. The Ritz Combination Principle Supports Quantum Theory 299
• 8. Quantum Theory Confirms the Ritz Combination Principle 301
• 9. Conclusion 303
• 10 | Mutually Supporting Evidence in Radiocarbon Dating 306
• 1. Introduction 306
• 2. How Radiocarbon Dating Works 307
• 3. The Need for Calibration 308
• 4. Relations of Evidential Support 310
• 11 | The Determination of Atomic Weights 314
• 1. Introduction 314
• 2. Dalton’s Atomic Theory 316
• 3. A Circularity: Atomic Weights and Molecular Formulae 318
• 4. A Failed Hypothesis of Simplicity 321
• 5. Breaking the Circularity 323
• 6. The Vaulted Inductive Structure of Atomic Weights and Molecular Formulae 328
• 7. Mutual Support of Atomic Weights and Molecular Formulae 330
• 8. Mutual Support of Avogadro’s Hypothesis and the Law of Dulong and Petit 335
• 9. Mutual Support of Avogadro’s Hypothesis in Chemistry and the Kinetic Theory of Gases 338
• 10. Hypothesis No More 343
• 12 | The Use of Hypotheses in Determining Distances in Our Planetary System 348
• 1. Introduction 348
• 2. An Evidential Circle: The Distances and Sizes of the Moon and Sun 350
• 3. Aristarchus: Breaking the Evidential Circles 352
• 4. Measurements of Parallax 356
• 5. The Parallax of Mars 358
• 6. The Transits of Venus 358
• 7. The Need for Hypotheses 361
• 8. Pythagorean and Platonic Harmonies 362
• 9. Ptolemy’s Planetary Hypotheses 365
• 10. The Copernican Hypothesis 370
• 11. Securing the Copernican Hypothesis 375
• 12. Crossing of Relations of Support 376
• 13. Conclusion 378
• 13 | Dowsing: The Instabilities of EvidentialCompetition 382
• 1. Introduction 382
• 2. The Phenomenon Established 385
• 3. Disputes over the Theory of Dowsing Processes 386
• 4. The Dispute over Geology 392
• 5. Dispute over the Phenomena 393
• 6. The Ideo-Motor Principle 397
• 7. The Diverging Inductive Logics 399
• 8. Conclusion: The Inductive Instability 400
• 14 | Stock Market Prediction: When Inductive Logics Compete 404
• 1. Introduction 404
• 2. The Systems 405
• 3. The Systems Compete 416
• 4. Conclusion: The Instability of Competing Systems 424
• Afterword 430
• Index 432
• Back Cover 450