Defending the Continent: NORAD Modernization and Beyond

Table of Contents Introduction The Cold War to 9/11 NWS Renewal and Beyond A Vulnerable Continent Deterrence by Detection and Denial A Return to the Past Conclusion End Notes About the Authors Canadian Global Affairs Institute Introduction North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) modernization is in the news these days, but it is often synonymous with an upgrade to the current North Warning System (NWS) only. NORAD modernization goes beyond technological upgrades and is part of a rethink of what it means to defend North America writ large. This article traces past efforts at modernization, the impetus for today’s focus on continental defence and the need to shift from dependence on deterrence by punishment to deterrence by detection and denial. TOP OF PAGE The Cold War to 9/11 North American continental defence has been a tertiary priority for both Canada and the United States, exhibiting extended periods of relative neglect interspersed by brief flurries of investment usually prompted by equipment life cycles. Both governments, or more accurately defence departments, have long prioritized overseas commitments as the key to the defence of North America. This has been reinforced, at least since the early 1960s to the end of the Cold War, by reliance upon the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent to protect North America. Any potential attack against North America was assumed to be a strategic nuclear one, and until just recently, there was no means to defend against it. Instead, this attack was deterred by the U.S. threat of strategic nuclear retaliation under the condition of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) (i.e., deterrence by punishment). In this context, NORAD played a key role as a function of its ballistic missile early warning mission. Accessing information from the U.S. Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), NORAD’s mission was to assess whether North America was under attack, and if so, characterize the nature of the attack and inform the National Command Authorities (NCA), a mission labelled Integrated Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment (ITW/AA). Although both countries’ NCA would be notified, the key decision-maker was the U.S. president, who has the authority to order a retaliatory strike. In effect, the U.S.’s strategic nuclear retaliatory deterrent made North America a sanctuary. The Soviet Union’s long-range bomber threat took a technological leap forward with the development and deployment of air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) in the 1970s and 1980s, and it became the fundamental defence rationale for the modernization of NORAD’s distant (air) early warning system (DEW line) with the deployment of NWS, not fully operational until 1993. The 1950s early warning system of three radar lines across Canada (the DEW, Mid-Canada and Pinetree lines) had reached their end of life and were technologically obsolete. Arguably, modernization would have been required even without the emergence of the ALCM threat; this threat simply made it militarily and politically expedient to authorize