The Rise and Fall of Military Strategic Communications at National Defence 2015-2021: A Cautionary Tale for Canada and NATO, and a Roadmap for Reform

20.500.12592/527c47

The Rise and Fall of Military Strategic Communications at National Defence 2015-2021: A Cautionary Tale for Canada and NATO, and a Roadmap for Reform

1 May 2022

Table of Contents Executive Summary I Introduction II A Wicked Problem Set III Problematic Policy Becomes Entrenched IV The Initiative Runs Into Heavy Turbulence V Internal Reviews Complete, Institutional Leaders Begin to Respond VI Lessons Observed VII Recommendations VIII Conclusion Appendix 1: The MilStratCom Initiative in Canada – A Timeline Appendix 2: Selection of Media Headlines 2020-2021 Figures Acronyms End Notes Author’s Note and Acknowledgments About the Author Canadian Global Affairs Institute Executive Summary On November 2, 2020, the Ottawa Citizen ran the front-page headline “Canadian Military Wants to Establish New Organization to Use Propaganda and Other Techniques to Influence Canadians.” This seemed an unbelievable story, and one initially denied by a spokesperson for the minister of National Defence. Just three days later, though, then-chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) Gen. Jonathan Vance shuttered the group in question, terminating an initiative more than five years in the making that called into question the Department of National Defence’s (DND) commitment to objective and appropriate public communication, at a time when truth decay, misinformation and disinformation have gained much traction around the world and in Canada. In June 2021, the day Parliament adjourned for the summer, DND acknowledged to select media that acting CDS Lt.-Gen. Wayne Eyre and then-deputy minister Jody Thomas had determined the initiative was “incompatible” with government communications policy and the vision, mission and principles of DND Public Affairs. In a surprising self-indictment, the leaders also admitted a lack of “institution-wide strategic level direction and guidance,” to build information-related capabilities that were “governed by appropriate authorities and oversight.” Deliberate influence campaigns by malign state, non-state and increasingly by domestic actors to disturb, disrupt and create disorder in democratic societies have become widespread and commonplace. The volume of vitriol is increasing. This is fast eroding citizen faith, trust and confidence in government and public institutions and may be the greatest contemporary threat liberal democracies face – arresting this trend and then restoring trust, the ultimate challenge. National Defence’s entire program – to be successful on operations; secure sufficient funding; recruit, train and retain; effect culture change; reconstitute the force post-pandemic and procure the equipment needed to contest, confront and defeat adversaries – will largely depend on whether the institution can modernize its approach to strategic communications to manoeuvre more agilely and to better effect in a complex, frenetic and hostile information environment. Recently, National Defence has suffered a significant self-inflicted setback in that regard. This monograph explains the rationale for, evolution of and factors behind the failure of the controversial Military Strategic Communications (MilStratCom) initiative: 10 lessons are identified and 20 recommendations suggested for how to recover lost ground and momentum. The initiative sought to create a new planning framework to more effectively co-ordinate everything the DND/Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) deliberately says, does and signals and thus communicates, to influence target audiences abroad or at home. That is a seriously ambitious undertaking, referring to all the means to inform, influence and persuade people (such as Public Affairs, information operations and psychological operations); actions (such as where the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) sends a frigate or where the army trains, which communicates something to someone, somewhere); and tools to coerce behavioural change (like bombs, bullets and missiles) or to deceive adversaries (deception operations
security media canada nato defence policy disinformation defence hybrid threats policy paper cyber & tech defence resources defence operations brett boudreau

Authors

Brett Boudreau

Published in
Canada

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