The statements made and views expressed in this paper are solely the responsibility of the author and do not represent the views of the Wilson Center or the Carnegie Corporation of New York. [...] However, Egypt and Sudan rejected the CPA out of fear of losing their “historic” water share enshrined in the 1959 treaty.15 The commencement of the construction of GERD is a game-changer insofar as the balance of power within the ENB,16 and represents an “internal transformation” within the regional security complex.17 The dam is part of Ethiopia’s development plan to eradicate poverty. [...] With the Nile providing more than 90 percent of the country’s water supply, Egypt argues that the dam poses an “existential threat” to millions of its people.18 Sudan is caught in the middle of the dam dispute, as a “buffer state” or “king-maker of the Nile,” swinging back and forth between the two.19 The three countries succeeded in signing the 2015 Declaration of Principles (DOP) on the GERD. [...] The soft governance measures encouraged both Ethiopians and Sudanese to grow crops, put cattle to pasture, and conduct trade in the area in an effort to reduce tensions and the urgency of border demarcation.26 However, “leadership changes and political turbulence in both countries have sharpened old rivalries between the two neighbors and brought the al-Fashaga dispute back to the fore.”27 Wilson. [...] The problem lies on the 1899 and 1902 colonial boundaries which first drew the Halayeb to Egypt in 1899, and then to Sudan in the latter agreement.29 The region is rich in natural resources such as manganese.
- Pages
- 8
- Published in
- Canada
