cover image: Digital ID, Surveillance, and the Value of Privacy_April 4, 2023_Justice Centre


Digital ID, Surveillance, and the Value of Privacy_April 4, 2023_Justice Centre

4 Apr 2023

11 This report then applies this distinction to the digital ID initiatives of the six comparator jurisdictions (C6) and finds that the digital ID initiatives of Italy, China, and Canada count as harmful precisely because they have the capacity to track the behaviours of their users across time and to develop, thereby, complex profiles of their users. [...] 25 The modality of the program is the mobile device, and the KTDI is supposed to allow users to digitally authenticate their identities to travel authorities.66 In its modality and intended function, therefore, the KTDI is not dissimilar from most of the programs encountered in the previous section. [...] That the KTDI considers this kind of otherwise private information to be relevant to risk assessment suggests that the KTDI is something closer to (e.g.,) the Smart Digital Wallet of Bologna or the social credit systems of China than to mere digital counterparts to traditional identification documents. [...] However, the sharing of information is consent-based, and the traveller retains the right to decide which information to share and with whom.72 Some people hold the intuition that an exchange is fair whenever the parties to the exchange consent to it. [...] The PCTF provides “consistent and auditable processes for the creation, management, and use of digital representations [of the identities] of people and other entities”77 and “defines conformance criteria necessary for Digital Identity Ecosystem participants and users to interact with assurance”.78 A stated goal of the DIACC for the PCTF is “to facilitate the migration of traditional or complex fa.
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