Table of Contents Introduction The Canadian Coast Guard and National Security: Keepers (?) of the High North Ongoing Icebreaker Procurements and Asset Density Icebreakers as C4ISR Nodes Concluding Thoughts End Notes About the Author Canadian Global Affairs Institute Introduction Icebreakers have played a critical role in maintaining national security by allowing states with persistent sea ice cover to access and exercise control over their sovereign territory, even in the harshest conditions. In the Arctic, icebreakers are predominantly used to clear paths for shipping lanes and to support resource exploration and extraction activities where there is seasonal or permanent ice coverage. They also support scientific research activity, search and rescue operations, oil spill responses and other operations that help maintain the safety and security of people in those otherwise remote regions. While long-term projections demonstrate that sea ice decline in the Arctic is bound to continue, this does not mean that operating conditions will be any less challenging in the coming years, nor does it suggest that the need for icebreakers will decline in the foreseeable future. On April 4, the Canadian government announced that Davie Shipyard would officially become the third National Shipbuilding Strategy yard for large procurements, providing them with the responsibility to build the Canadian Coast Guard’s (CCG) fleet of program icebreakers in addition to one polar icebreaker. The concurrency of these procurements and return to strategic competition in the Arctic region is the perfect opportunity to explore an enhanced maritime domain awareness (MDA) role for the impending fleet of new CCG icebreakers. Icebreakers offer the only means for consistent maritime surface presence in the high North. While naval offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) may have some icebreaking capability in littoral waters due to hull reinforcement, icebreakers are purposely built to handle the harsh weather conditions and heavy ice-covered waters where they carry out their typical escort function. The CCG is the federal organization responsible for ice management and icebreaking services in the Arctic. The CCG oversees several other tasks that pertain to maritime navigation, traffic management, search and rescue and pollution control. The national security role that the CCG provides as part of its icebreaking activity, alongside the manner in which the organization interfaces with the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), requires contextualization. Because access to northern waters is restricted to a select few vessels, and because ice levels vary from year to year, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) is unable to retain a consistent and persistent presence. As a result, CCG icebreakers occupy the unique role of providing a persistent, physical presence that can also, if properly equipped, significantly contribute to MDA. As the Arctic returns to a place of geo-strategic importance in an increasingly competitive global landscape, inclusion of the CCG’s next generation of Arctic-capable ships into the continental defence system-of-systems (command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance – C4ISR) will be critical for providing decision-makers the best possible information for effective decisions and mission execution in the Arctic. C4ISR, which broadly refers to the integration and co-ordination of various military systems and activities for decision-making and mission execution, is the key to operational effectiveness in a network-centric environment. New challenges in the operating domain, fast-paced developments in military and civilian technologies and new ways of conducting operations (including with other government agencies and coalition forces), require C4ISR systems to have greater levels of flexibility, adaptability and interoperability.1 C4ISR is the catalyst controlling the speed at which military capability can actually be applied, particularly through the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) portions of the concept. If there is a plethora of information available that can be substantiated as of adequate quality, then decision times can be sharp and decisive (and vice versa). Icebreakers, given their well-established mandate of surveillance and MDA and their functional capacity to operate in a networked environment, therefore constitute a primary node of information attainment and capture in the high North for C4ISR in Canada’s case. To highlight the value and opportunities icebreakers present in the context of C4ISR activities, we must examine the concept CCG of operations, and then determine if there is need, budget and capacity to expand their mission set. The impetus for this examination is fourfold: first, Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE) is clear in articulating that the growing complexity of global security demands a sophisticated awareness of the operating environment in all domains.2 If system-of-systems networks will provide the connectivity and the real-time flow of information needed to ensure tactical advantage and operational success in that environment, then integration of all possible strategic assets will be necessary to maximize the data collection and enable the information dominance and subsequent decision superiority that decision-makers require. Second, it is critically important that Canada is aware of what is going on in its Arctic waters. Nestled in the 2022 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada was a particularly eye-opening audit of Arctic surveillance and MDA which suggested that a number of longstanding issues centred on incomplete surveillance, insufficient traffic data, poor means of information sharing and a notable inability to respond to safety and security incidents could result in the CCG losing presence in the Arctic.3 While the audit cited weaknesses in satellite surveillance capability, patrol aircraft reaching the end of their service lives and a lack of adequate infrastructure for patrol equipment, the point raised on a potential icebreaking capability gap, compounded with further delays on Arctic OPV procurements, rings alarm bells over Canada’s ability to maintain sovereignty-based intentions in the high North. Third, recent procurement announcements made by Russia and China provide cause to reconsider the function of the humble icebreaker as a strategic maritime asset. Multiple Chinese Arctic deployments of the icebreakers Xue Long and Xue Long 2, using scientific research as a pretence, have allowed China to map underwater infrastructure and survey potential SSBN bastions. China sees the strategic value of presence and domain awareness in the Arctic: Canada must also. Finally, for several years, Canada and the United States have been increasingly concerned over the defence and security of continental North America, leading to actions directed at the mitigation of known capability gaps. Last summer, Canada committed to modernizing the aerospace aspects of continental defence through its NORAD modernization proposals, including improvements to “domain awareness of North American approaches,” yet neglected to make any tangible enhancements to Canada’s established maritime defence and security arrangements.4
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