Bill C-11 and the Consumption of Online Information: A Sinister Encroachment into Canadians’ Freedom of Expression

The essay (1) provides an overview of key features of the Online Streaming Act, (2) argues that the bill is morally and philosophically unacceptable, and (3) considers avenues for arguing that the Online Streaming Act is not constitutionally viable.3 II. [...] The CRTC may, for example, make orders that impose conditions with respect to “the proportion of programs to be broadcast that shall be devoted to specific genres, in order to ensure the diversity of programming.”7 Third, the Online Streaming Act introduces perhaps the most significant amendment to the Broadcasting Act since its enactment in 1991. [...] That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”9 Mill’s principle flows from his concern about the tyranny of the majority.10 He warned of the “increasing inclination to stretch unduly the powers of society over the individual, both by the force of opinion and even by that of legislation.”1. [...] The new objectives of the Broadcasting Act are purportedly aimed at advancing equality,24 as they refer to the uplifting of Black, Indigenous, and other minority voices.25 The Minister of Justice stated that the amendments “promote the values that underlie equality rights protected by section 15 of the 18 Irwin Toy at 976; see also: Ford v Quebec, [1988] 2 SCR 712 at 765-766. [...] Proportionality The last step of the section 1 analysis asks whether the benefits of the infringement on society outweigh the negative effects on individual rights.32 As described above, there is little to no benefit in allowing the CRTC to decide what content should be discoverable to Canadians.