The Canadian Judicial Council has long been aware of the inefficiencies of the executive model of Court administration as well as the challenge it presents to the independence of the judiciary. [...] The Subcommittee believes the alternative the Report calls the “Limited Autonomy and Commission Model” will best achieve the goals set out in the terms of reference and what the Supreme Court of Canada refers to in the Remuneration Reference as the constitutional imperative of depoliticizing, to the extent possible, relations between the judiciary and other branches of government. [...] The models examined in this report address two kinds of relationships: 1. the relationship between the judiciary and the government—that is, the relationship that defines the accountabilities and responsibilities of the judiciary or “Court” 2 with respect to court administration policy and operations vis-à-vis the government or the Legislature, the Attorney General and/or the CEO of an independent [...] The second part of the discussion looks at possible institutional obstacles to change in the area of administrative autonomy, namely the federal and parliamentary structures of Canada in the context of the separation of powers. [...] However, the independence of the judiciary, the effectiveness and efficiency of the courts, and public confidence in the justice system requires an improved and robust model that ensures that jurisdictions take full advantage of more of the types of improvements that have already proven to be advantageous.