The answers lie in the monumental factors that comprise Japanese security: the legacy of the Pacific War1, Japanese government policy, and of course, the Japan-US Alliance, to name a few. [...] Thirdly, due to the Defense Minister's prominent role in the deliberations and also to the presence of his American counterpart, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was essentially elbowed out of the discussion; cutting edge defense agreements would from then on be in the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense, not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [...] The debate began to swirl around the issue of use of force, as Diet members argued over "applying the scope of the PKO Cooperation Law to the possibility that the JSDF may have to utilize force overseas,"58 a concept no Diet member was prepared to address. [...] One theory as to why the public resisted the legislation so fiercely is: Abe has not been able to give a clear explanation about the change in the constitutional interpretation of the exercise of the right to self-defense…. [...] As the JSDF evolved over the years, their outward image, roles, and missions changed but the laws stayed the same; as a matter of fact, even today the regulations governing how JSDF personnel may utilize weapons is in the "Police Officers' Duties Law," located in the Japanese civil code.103 This is where the authority and responsibility mess originates regarding the JSDF's inability to use force;