Implementation of Our North, Strong and Free

Mr. Chair, Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today and speak to Canada’s new defence policy, Our North, Strong and Free. In my opening remarks I’ll speak about the policy itself, considerations for its implementation and how I think it is being viewed by Canada’s allies in the context of the Washington, D.C.. NATO Summit celebrating the alliance’s 75th anniversary three weeks from now. Our North, Strong and Free is a bit of a paradox. On one hand, building on previous defence policies dating back to 2005 it does a good job of capturing the fraught international security environment we live in and how Canada needs to respond to deal with our current reality. It also pledges to invest in many needed capabilities and makes a generationally large commitment of funding to the Canadian military. By my math, the financial commitment that has been made since 2017 is roughly a quarter of a trillion dollars on a cash basis, over about quarter century. On the other hand, though, Our North, Strong and Free falls well short of where we should be in terms of committing resources to defence and changing the behaviour needed to use resources effectively. It also highlights a widening disconnect between Canada’s approach to defence and that of our allies and demonstrates no intention on Canada’s part of living up the key commitment we made to our NATO allies regarding defence investment. Given that the policy took two years to produce, it is a serious shortcoming that it only announces a review of defence procurement, instead of revealing how we will actually change defence procurement. Similarly, the policy offers little indication of how recruiting and enrolling new Canadian troops will be addressed and outlines an absurdly long 8-year window to return to CAF to its current authorized strength – one, I’d note, which will be insufficient to operate the promised new equipment such as Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft. The policy also bizarrely notes the need for new capabilities like submarines and integrated air and missile defence, which it pledges to explore, but provides no money to actually acquire. As a result, if everything in Our North, Strong and Free unfolded exactly as intended the day it was published, Canada’s defence spending would have reached just 1.76% of GDP by 2029. As everyone here knows, Canada committed to spend at least 2% of GDP on defence, but this policy clearly conveys that we have no intention of doing so.