cover image: Hanniman Kyle Paper 2 for Stablizaing Prov Revenues

20.500.12592/t204cd

Hanniman Kyle Paper 2 for Stablizaing Prov Revenues

28 Nov 2019

The federal government is free to change most aspects of the system unilaterally, but must – for the sake of national unity and its own electoral interests – take provincial views into account. [...] What, if anything, can we do to remedy this situation? One potential measure is the establishment of an independent council responsible for monitoring the performance of the transfer system and advising the federal government on its reform (Hanniman 2015).1 Such a body would not replace federal decision-making, nor would it eliminate the self-interested bargaining that we have come to know so well. [...] It could, for example: • challenge misconceptions about the transfer system and its effects (such as the notions that Quebec is the largest per capita recipient of equalization or that equalization is financed by provincial budgets); • provide journalists and voters with the information they need to hold the federal government and provincial critics accountable; • evaluate the merits of existing t. [...] Indeed, the success of the council likely depends on its ability to convince voters of the wisdom and fairness of its proposals, even ones that challenge voters’ material interests (this is one way a council might embolden the federal government to pursue controversial initiatives). [...] The first study (the results of which we will report soon) presents voters in Quebec with a proposal to increase equalization payments for two English-speaking provinces – Ontario and Newfoundland and Labrador – and justifies these increases on the grounds that existing payments fail to compensate these provinces for the high costs of service delivery.
Pages
4
Published in
Canada