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Are Cartel Fines Optimal? Theory …
Table

Coherent Identifier

20.500.12592/mdjh4v

Table 1 on page 30

Found in: Are Cartel Fines Optimal? Theory and Evidence from the European …

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Citation

M.-L. Allain, M., 2013. Are Cartel Fines Optimal? Theory and Evidence from the European Union, Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organizations. Canada Retrieved from https://canadacommons.ca/artifacts/2035031/are-cartel-fines-optimal-theory-and-evidence-from-the-european-union/2787474/fragments/845763/ on 19 May 2024. CID: 20.500.12592/n0rwvt.

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