Multiple Marketing Mechanisms and the Performance of Multi-Unit Demand Sequential Auctions : The Case of Quebec Hog Market

I would also like to express my gratitude to the teachers, researchers and the administrative staff of the Centre for Research in the Economics of Agri-food (CRÉA) at the University Laval. [...] Clearly the differences between the first three valuations and the fourth one must be large compared to the differences between the 4th and the 5th and 6th. [...] Bidder A knows that and the price for the second and third objects is the same: 03 which explains the flat segment. [...] The decreases in valuations from the k+l th object must be increasingly small relative to the decrease in valuation between the kth and (k+l)th objects as the number of objects auctioned increases, thus making asymmetric allocations more likely when the number of objects is large. [...] Starting at the bottom of the subgame tree of figure 2.4, we can see that the vector of gross payoffs when bidder A wins all four objects is (61; 0; 0), which is simply the sum of the valuations for the objects won by the bidders.