Venezuela’s Bolivarian Armed Force: Fear and Interest in the Face of Political Change

During the Chávez period, a fifth force, the Bolivarian Militia, was created with its own chain of command that by-passed the military high command and the Ministry of Defense and led directly to the president.9 Of these, the army has traditionally been (and still is) the dominant institutional and political force. [...] The regional diplomatic coalition organized to press for democratic change in Venezuela, the Lima Group, has been weakened with the election of leaders in Argentina and Mexico who are more sympathetic to the Maduro government.30 Furthermore, the impact of the novel Internationally, the situation coronavirus pandemic on Latin America31 has for the Maduro regime has diminished regional governments’. [...] likely to be even worse than those in neighboring countries, in a region harder hit by the disease than other parts of the world.38 Like many governments in the region, the Maduro regime has given the Venezuelan military important domestic responsibilities for addressing the COVID-19 crisis, and it has particularly used the pandemic to increase its internal security measures against the opposition. [...] In addition, the focus of some opposition members on the presumed criminality of the armed forces contributes to the impression that the opposition is unable and unwilling to differentiate among military members that are truly guilty of the most egregious crimes, such as violations of human rights, and those who have avoided such activities. [...] One of the hindrances to promoting a transition in Venezuela that achieves at least the acquiescence of the military (if not its active support) is the too-close identification of the Venezuelan opposition with the United States, the hypothetical main adversary of the Venezuelan armed forces.