cover image: Action on Ukraine, Quiescence on Myanmar:  F

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Action on Ukraine, Quiescence on Myanmar: F

7 Apr 2022

Contrary to its The other side of the coin, however, is that approach to the Myanmar junta, Singapore took differences in interest and a lack of enthusiasm the unprecedented step of imposing sanctions for ideology also exist within the so-called on Russia despite the likely negative economic “authoritarian axis.” While aligned against the impact on Southeast Asia as a result of rising United State. [...] and in support of Myanmar’s junta, Russian and Fundamentally, the contrast in the responses Chinese risk tolerances are somewhat divergent, to Ukraine and Myanmar point to the as can be seen in Ukraine. [...] While unlikely to be separated in Washington-Hanoi relations and the coldness with the manner of China and the Soviet Union during Phnom Penh lies in strategic interest rather than the later Cold War, Beijing and Moscow do harbor the level of democracy in either country. [...] China may have steadily Comparing the crises in Ukraine and Myanmar warmed up to the military, but it does so largely exposes the differences in international out of concern for the Tatmadaw’s poor tactical responses to Russia and China and challenges the performance and a calculation that an NUG “democracy versus authoritarianism” framing. [...] is not reliable insurance for a stable Myanmar, Crucially, the United States could also argue that as anti-junta sentiment is so prevalent and the the NUG and other pro-democracy actors, such as Tatmadaw’s military performance so poor, that the the National Unity Consultative Council, are the war seems likely to extend into the future.
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6
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Canada